Acceptance of Vaccination Programs as a Health Attitude: The Influence of Public Trust

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Acknowledgment

The authors are grateful to all those who volunteered with conducting the public opinion survey, and who also often paid for their own expenses, namely Jonida Lika and Denisa Rira from the University of Tirana, Albania; Rina Ajvazi, Saranda Berisha, Trëndelina Buja, Hermonda Kalludra, Blerina Miftari, Blerta Nuredini and Vesa Zatriqi from the University of Warsaw, UBT Kosovo campus; Habibe Ademi, Arton Demolli, Arrita Deva, Përparim Hashani, Valmira Hoxha, Blerina Islami, Ardit Konjufca, Gresa Konjufca, Gazmend Obrazhda, Drenushë Osmani, Gentiana Sahiti, Brigita Rexha, Dynjah Xhakli, Vildane Xhemaili, and Blerina Zeqiri from the University for Business and Technology, Kosovo; Erenik Dujaka from Universum College, Kosovo; Lekë Hoxha of the Muscatine Community College, Iowa; and Rrezar Dema of Utica College, New York. Steve Voss of the University of Kentucky helped with survey design and methodology, as well as partially financing the survey. We feel indebted to ourcolleagues and fellow administrators with our institutions, University for Business and Technology, Kosovo, and University of North Texas, USA, who took over more courses and more administrative work to open more time for us to conduct this research.

Abstract

We argue that support for reinstatement of capital punishment might reflect protest against an untrustworthy judicial system, framing this as a protest attitude. We test our argument with data from a probability sample of 2,366 respondents in Albania collected in 2015 via a cell phone random digit dialing technique (RDD). We found that respondents' support for reinstatement of the death penalty is associated with lack of trust in the country's judiciary, but not necessarily respondents prioritizing war on crime. Also, we found that skepticism toward EU membership conditionality as a drive for the country's democratization is a good predictor of support for reinstatement of the death penalty, but there is no evidence that respondents related their support for the country's EU membership with support for capital punishment.

Keywords: death penalty reinstatement; trust in the judiciary; trust in politicians; EU membership conditionality; prioritizing war on crime; protest attitude

Introduction

Whereas much of the literature tries to explain people's attitudes toward the death penalty in countries where it continues to remain part of the penal code or practice, there is less research dedicated to understanding attitudes toward capital punishment in abolitionist jurisdictions (Adinkrah & Clemens, 2018). Partisans of the abolitionist movement have hoped that once abolished, people will accept the absence of the death penalty, and so the world would smoothly move toward a world free of capital punishment (Peshkopia & Imami, 2008). However, even after decades of practical or legal abolition, many people in abolitionist countries show strong

support for the death penalty (Hessing et al., 2003). This is even more so in former communist Central and Eastern Europe, where in spite of death penalty abolition for over two decades now, people continue to hold strong opinions about it and occasionally campaign for its restoration (Peshkopia, 2014; Peshkopia & Imami, 2008).[1] Attitudes toward reinstatement of the death penalty can serve to measure not only people's attitudes toward capital punishment as a public policy, but also their relationships with the institutions that provide justice and even the political class in general (Jurow, 1971; Warr & Stafford, 1984). In many cases, such a relationships are not positive. High levels of corruption among both politicians and the judicial system, coupled with slow economic growth and relatively high crime and corruption rates, have eroded trust in the political elites and the judiciary in some countries in the southeastern corner of Europe (English, 2008). We argue that support for reinstatement of the death penalty might reflect people's protest against an untrustworthy judicial system as well as politicians who might control and manipulate it.

Moreover, although all European countries except Belarus have abolished the death penalty, abolition in the eastern part of the continent came not only without any public consultation—and in some cases by constitutional court decisions rather than legislative acts—but also under severe pressure from the European Union (EU) in the form of membership conditionality (Peshkopia & Imami, 2008). Since 1998, the EU has included abolition of the death penalty in policy changes that membership aspiring countries must adopt in order to acquire EU membership (Hessing et al., 2003; Peshkopia, 2014; Peshkopia & Imami, 2008). Therefore, we argue that people's views toward their country's EU membership and EU membership conditionality would be related to their attitudes toward reinstatement of the capital punishment.

We test our argument in Albania—a country which abolished the death penalty for peacetime crimes in 2000 and for all crimes in 2007 (Peshkopia, 2014)—with data collected through a public opinion survey conducted in Albania in summer 2015, using a cell phone random digit dialing (RDD) technique enabled by the iziSurvey survey platform. We build a set of ordered probit models to predict people's attitudes toward reinstatement of the death penalty. Our analysis explores our proposition that people's support for reinstatement of the death penalty reflects a protest attitude. This tenet posits that support for reinstatement of the death penalty can be predicted with low trust in the judicial system and politicians, as well as people's skepticism toward EU membership conditionality as an instrument of the country's democratization. Moreover, we explore whether respondents' fear of crime, in the form of prioritizing war on crime, plays any role in predicting people's attitudes toward reinstatement of the death penalty.

Determinants and Correlates of People's Attitudes toward the Death Penalty

The demographic correlates of support and opposition to capital punishment are well established. Supporters of capital punishment are disproportionately white (Bobo & Johnson, 2004; J. K. Cochran & Chamlin, 2006; J. L. Johnson & Johnson, 2001), male (J. K. Cochran & Sanders, 2009; Robbers, 2006; Stack, 2000), Protestant (Grasmick et al., 1993), politically conservative (Longmire, 1996; Young, 1991), and married (Fox et al., 1990). These findings have been consistently observed in nearly every modern study of capital punishment opinion. The empirical record is quite clear as to "who" tends to support capital punishment. We know relatively less about why people support or oppose the death penalty.

Research on the underlying sources of attitudes toward capital punishment has shown that support and opposition are not based on the rational, pragmatic effects of the policy itself. Rather, people's attitudes toward the death penalty are linked to their personal value systems

(Bohm, 2014; Vollum et al., 2004). The empirical record on what these values are is still developing. To be sure, people often cite practical reasons, such as deterrence, when asked why they support or oppose the death penalty (Bohm et al., 1991). Several studies have shown, however, that death penalty opinions are generally immutable (Bohm et al., 1993; Bohm & Vogel, 2004; Vollum et al., 2009). Subjects who claim they support the death penalty for its deterrent value tend to be unaffected when presented with information showing the death penalty does not deter crime (Lee et al., 2014). The conclusion is that death penalty opinions are expressions of people's underlying personal values. The results of these studies have been imperative to answering various research questions, most notably those pertaining to Marshall hypothesis (Bohm, 2014).[1]

Some of the most common research on the values underlying capital punishment opinions, and punitiveness in general, has explored their relationship to attitudes toward crime and criminal justice institutions. The tenet of this research is that public opinion of capital punishment may be an expression of more general attitudes about the prevalence of crime and criminal justice institutions' ability to effectively control crime. Citizens who feel that crime rates are escalating, unprecedentedly high, or generally "out of control" would be more likely to develop feelings of fear and/or anger toward crime. This in turn would lead to support for harsh punishment as a means to control the threat of crime and mitigate the concomitant fear and anger toward it. However, research on the relationship between crime and criminal justice attitudes and punitiveness have yielded mixed results. Some studies show a significant and positive association between punitiveness and the perceived prevalence of crime (Hogan, 2005; Soss et al., 2003) and general concerns about crime (Costelloe et al., 2009; Hogan, 2005). Findings regarding fear and anger toward crime also vary. Johnson (2009) showed that anger about crime could predict support for punitive criminal penalties net the effects of other covariates. Unnever, Cullen, and Fisher (2005) found that prior victimization and fear of crime had a positive, albeit weak, effect on support for the death penalty. Likewise, Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz (2009) showed that prior victimization and fear of crime, as well as concern about crime, predicted a scale measuring support for harsh punishment. Fear of crime has also been directly linked to support for the death penalty (Applegate et al., 2002). Conversely, Kleck and Jackson (2017) found that fear of crime had no significant effect on general measures of punitiveness, such as support for longer prison sentences. One other study showed fear of crime could predict support for the death penalty among Whites but not Black respondents (Trahan & Laird, 2018).

Relatedly, some studies have explored whether trust/confidence in criminal justice institutions' ability to effectively control crime is related to support for the death penalty. The postulate is that citizens who lack faith in the effectiveness of criminal justice systems will be more likely to adopt punitive attitudes, such as support for the death penalty. If police, courts, or corrections are not effective, increasing the severity of criminal penalties will increase the utility of these institutions. The effect of trust in criminal justice institutions on punitive attitudes are also equivocal. Some studies have shown distrust of courts is significantly and positively associated with support for harsh punishment (J. C. Cochran & Piquero, 2017; Zimring et al., 2001), whereas other research has shown that trust in police dominates Black Americans' correlates of attitudes toward the death penalty (Young, 1991). Also, Messner, Baumer, and Rosenfeld (2006) found that distrust in the US Supreme Court, as well as other branches of the federal government, increased the odds of support for the death penalty for Whites but decreased the odds of support for Blacks. Other studies have found no significant relationship between trust

in the courts and punitiveness, particularly when controlling for other covariates (Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2010).

The literature discussed here has two major shortcomings for the purpose of our research: first, most of it draws from the United States, a country where capital punishment applies in 28 states as well as for federal crimes (Bohm, 1987; Gross, 1998). Naturally, this US-centered argument begs the question of whether it can be applied to other social settings at all, and if so, to what extent it needs to be adjusted in order to accommodate cultural and historical idiosyncrasies found in other societies. Can it help to explain people's support for the death penalty and its restoration in countries with high levels of corruption and high crime rates, and where the public lack trust in their politicians and the judiciary? In this case, those attitudes might reflect wider antisystem attitudes that could include distrust toward both politicians and the judiciary as causes of people's support for both the death penalty and its reinstatement in abolitionist countries. The study presented here explores these issues.

Support for the Death Penalty as a Protest Attitude

We maintain that the explanation of antisystem motivated support for the death penalty, expressed as support for its reinstatement, can be framed as protest attitude. Focusing either on fear of the judiciary or fear of crime, much of the existing literature in the US implies a judiciary that generally works, although in a biased way against certain social groups. However, in other world regions, judiciary systems might not work with the same efficiency. High corruption and inefficiency levels cause delays in providing justice for the victims, offers leniency to wrongdoers, and bows to political pressure to exonerate corrupt government officials and their cronies in such a systematic way that malfunctioning becomes routine rather than just an exception. Those cases might display a different, even inverse relationship between trust in the judiciary and attitudes toward the death penalty compared to the Western societies. We reframe support for the death penalty and its reinstatement as a protest attitude caused not by distrust of a judiciary's implicit bias, but as distrust toward an inefficient and corrupt judiciary, often biased in favor of and controlled by the politicians. If people perceive the judiciary as corrupt and inefficient, then those who principally oppose the death penalty might express support for its reinstatement more as a protest against the judiciary and politicians who control and manipulate it than as a belief in such an extreme form of punishment.

Summarizing different dictionary definitions of the word "protest," Lofland (1985) noted several dimensions of protest, namely dissent or objection that is (1) relatively extreme in the context; (2) strongly felt; (3) directed to some person or institution with power over one; (4) in a solemn and formal fashion; (5) publicly displayed; and (6) based on a sense of injustice. Scholars have argued that at the heart of every protest rest grievances, be them in the form of experiences of illegitimate inequality, perceptions of relative deprivation, perceptions of injustice, moral indignation about some state of affairs, or suddenly imposed grievances (Klandermans, 1997). Those different forms of grievances can lead to different forms of protest. For instance, illegitimate inequality, a major source of protest in social justice theories, and the suddenly imposed grievances—emanating from unexpected threats or encroachments upon people's rights or lifestyle (Walsh, 1981)—represent conflicts of interests that would generate instrumental forms of protests to bring about change (Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009). However, grievances resulting from violated principles—moral outrage against perceived violation of important values or principles—more likely lead to protests in which people express their views and indignation (Stekelenburg et al., 2009).

Sometimes the borderline between both types of protest might be blurry. Whereas support for reinstatement of the death penalty might look like a form of protest that demands change; in our case we interpret it more as indignation. Therefore, one can argue that by expressing support for reinstatement of the death penalty, people might express protest against a judiciary that does not work, rather than stating any lust for the death penalty as a punitive policy. Those data lend support to our argument that support for the death penalty reinstatement might not represent a lust for the death penalty as a punishment policy, but rather as a form of protest against a judiciary that, instead of being perceived as a direct contender in a conflict of interests case, is being perceived more as a violator of the basic principle of actually providing justice.

It is likely that people, appalled by the inefficiency and corruption of their judicial system, support reinstatement of the death penalty as a traditional form of punishment which they might perceived as justice that works. Those people might want simply to throw their support for reinstatement of the death penalty as a protest of their inefficient judicial system and politicians who control it. The fact that this very judiciary has abolished the death penalty under tacit approval of the politicians and under the EU pressure in the form of EU membership conditionality might make people even more angry with it. Supporting reinstatement of the death penalty might be the face of people's indignation. Hence our hypotheses:

H1. Support for capital punishment reinstatement is negatively associated with trust in the country's judiciary system.

H2. Support for capital punishment reinstatement is negatively associated with trust in the country's politicians.

The EU has been a major actor in the abolition movement since 1998, when it included death penalty abolition in its membership conditionality (Peshkopia & Imami, 2008). By the same token, the EU has been prompt to warn any rhetorical suggestion to reinstate capital punishment by any of its members, candidates, or potential candidate countries. On the other side, former communist Eastern European countries that have acquired or aspire to acquire EU membership are both informed of the role that EU membership conditions have played in abolition and are aware of the political consequences of reinstating capital punishment (Peshkopia, 2014; Peshkopia & Imami, 2008). Hence we can hypothesize:

H3. Support for capital punishment reinstatement is negatively associated with support for the country's EU membership.

H4. Support for capital punishment reinstatement is negatively associated with beliefs that EU membership conditions help the country's democratization.

Testing our theoretical claims in Albania has two advantages. First, by all accounts, the Albanian judicial system is extremely inefficient, corrupt, controlled by the politics, and highly unpopular (Council of Europe, 2014; Mero, 2014). Second, similar to other former communist Central and Eastern European countries, Albania has abolished the death penalty, but Albanians continue to hold strong opinions about capital punishment, and often demand its restoration, especially after news of horrible crimes shock public opinion (Peshkopia, 2014; Peshkopia & Imami, 2008). Therefore, our question "How much do you support the restoration of the death penalty?" remains meaningful. Second, we test several policy preferences of the respondents, namely their prioritizing of EU membership, fighting against corruption, fighting against crime, and reinstatement of the death penalty. Those four policy preferences were among five options respondents were asked to rank according to their perceived relevance to the respondent. We leave out of consideration prioritizing the economy in order to allow variance for the other four

policy preferences. Also, in line with research on people's attitudes toward the death penalty, we also controlled for the effects of several socioeconomic variables such as age and education (Bohm, 1987; Borg, 1997); sex (Bohm, 1987; Boots & Cochran, 2011; Borg, 1997; Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Lambert et al., 2014; Vidmar & Ellswoth, 1974; Whitehead & Blankenship, 2000); religion affiliation (Britt, 1998; Gramsick et al., 1992); religiosity (Baker & Booth, 2016; Britt, 1998; Grasmick et al., 1993; Grasmick & McGill, 1994); and employment status (Peshkopia & Voss, 2016b, 2016a).

Data and Methods

Data Collection Methodology

We test our hypotheses with data that we collected in summer 2015 in Albania using a cell phone RDD technique through the iziSurvey digital platform, and with a survey specifically designed to test our hypotheses. We conducted the interviews on the two biggest cell phone networks in the country, Vodafone and AMC, which combine for 78% of the country's cell phone users (AKEP, 2016). A cell phone RDD technique is a very efficient way to achieve a probability sample in a country with a severe lack of widely and evenly spread landlines, especially in the countryside. Perhaps for that reason, the penetration of SIM cards in the country in 2015 was 180%, with many people using more than one cell phone in order to benefit from more favorable prices within each network.[2] Specifically, during the second quarter of 2015, the period of our surveys, there were 3,188,130 active SIM cards in a country with a population of 2,800,138, with Vodafone owning 47% of the market share and AMC with 31% (AKEP, 2016; INSTAT, 2011). This 78% market share—with no evidence of socioeconomic differences between users of different cell phone networks—offers confidence that we reached a very good sampling frame.

We consider the cell phone RDD sampling in the Balkans to have some advantages compared to other sampling techniques. First, it has an advantage over door-to-door sampling methods partly because residential patterns are complicated by the close proximity of single-family and multi-family dwellings, and partly because in most communities either the norms, family structure, or suspicion of the state rule out approaching people in their homes. Therefore, such a method would create strong and systematic biases in the sample (Peshkopia & Voss, 2016b, 2016a). Second, unlike the United States, in most European countries, including Albania, cell phone providers use a single, national code number, freeing the sampling process from any stratification needs that come with different U.S. area codes. Third, iziSurvey has been designed specifically, though not exclusively, as a tool to facilitate cell phone RDD sampling. Beyond its user-friendly and easy to learn design, iziSurvey has several features that secure it from an interviewer's cheating. One of its most important features is that the researcher can notice when a respondent has not been reached via RDD. Fourth, since the Balkans and the Albanian cell phone space has not yet been invaded by phone marketers as intrusively as in other world regions, people continue to be receptive to calls from unknown numbers, thus increasing survey efficiency and eliminating potential sample bias.

Data Frame and Variables

We contacted 4,949 people, and 2,839 of them opted to respond, hence a response rate of 57.37%. For various reasons, only 2,272 respondents finished the survey (a 45.9% completion rate according to the AAPOR Cell Phone Task Force (2010) definition, and much higher than the usual 10%-20% repose rate that RDD cellphone surveys achieve in the US (AAPOR Cell Phone Task Force, 2010)). The survey generated missing values, some of them occurring because respondents dropped the survey altogether, and others because they did not respond to the last question that measured our dependent variable. The maximum number of observations for any of

the variables was 2,366, including variables that measure age, sex, education, religious affiliation or lack thereof, and respondents being employed. The other variables carry fewer observations. We overcame this problem by applying a multiple imputation procedure for data missing at random (von Hippel, 2009; von Hippel & Lynch, 2013; White et al., 2011). Also, cellphone public opinion surveys in the Balkans tend to generate male overrepresentation and overrepresentation of younger people, which brings about the need for poststratification weights (Peshkopia, 2019). Relying on a general consensus that weights should apply to descriptive statistics (Kish & Frankel, 1970), we apply analytical weights in our descriptive statistics (Tables 1, 2, and 3). In spite of the lack of the same level of consensus on whether weights should routinely apply in regression analysis (Kott, 2007; Winship & Radbill, 1994), we did apply weights in our statistical tests and explanatory models.

We used a dependent variable measured as scaled responses to the question "How much do you support reinstatement of the death penalty?" The variable is operationalized in a four-scale response with 0=Not at all; 1=Little; 2=Somewhat; 3=Much. We measured trust in politicians and trust in the judiciary as categorical responses (0=Not at all; 1=Little; 2=Somewhat; 3=Much) to the questions "How much do you trust country's politicians?" and "How much do you trust country's judicial system?", respectively. By the same token, we measured support for country's EU membership as categorical responses (0=Not at all; 1=Little; 2=Somewhat; 3=Much) to the questions "How much do you support country's EU membership?" Also, we measured Religiosity as categorical responses (0=Not at all; 1=Little; 2=Somewhat; 3=Much) to the questions "How much do you practice religion?"

We also use a number of control variables that extant literature has identified as determinants or associates of attitudes toward the death penalty, such as age (Maggarda et al., 2012; O'Neil et al., 2004; Whitehead et al., 1998), gender (Hurwitz & Smithey, 1998; O'Neil et al., 2004; Whitehead et al., 1998; Whitehead & Blankenship, 2000), education (Maggarda et al., 2012; O'Neil et al., 2004), household economic optimism (Williams et al., 2019), income (O'Neil et al., 2004), religion affiliation, and frequency of practicing religion (O'Neil et al., 2004; Rade et al., 2017). We generated variables Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox, and No religion as dummy variables with 1 denoting those who picked the respective response options of the question "What is your religion affiliation?", and denoting with 0 all the other response options (we left outside the regression analysis variables Other and No responses generated the same way). We generated the variable "Employed" as a dummy variable with 1 denoting those who indicated they were either employed in public, employed in private, or self-employed, and 0 denoting all the other response options (housekeeper, retired, student, handicapped, and emigrant abroad, an Albanian who has migrated abroad, but who happened to visit his home country at the time we were conducting our survey and was randomly reached for an interview).

The variable "Age" is an interval variable of self-reported age. The variable "Gender" is a dummy variable (0=male and 1=female). The variable "Education" is an interval variable of self-reported years of education. The variable "Economic optimism" measures respondents' perceptions of their current household economic performance compared with the previous year (-1=deteriorated; 0=remained the same; and 1=improved). The variable "Personal income" is a scalar variable of six income categories. Variables for prioritizes country's EU membership, prioritizes war on corruption, prioritizes war on crime, prioritizes reinstatement of death penalty all measure respondents' ranking of those policy priorities. Figure 1 shows the distribution of those four variables, confirming our earlier claim that death penalty reinstatement ranks very low in people's list of political priorities.

[Figure 1 about here]

Methods

Survey responses to the dependent variable represent somewhat fuzzy categories of attitude measurement rather than attitudinal fixed and exact points. Therefore, we expect that lurking under our survey questions rest a continuous range of unobserved attitudes and policy preferences with real values presumably ranging from -∞ to +∞, normally distributed around the typical (presumably mixed) perception of the policy preference, normally distributed such that only very few people greatly abhor or truly lust for death penalty reinstatement. Therefore, ordered probit models would be the most appropriate ones for the multivariate analysis of those presumed normally distributed attitudes.

Results

We begin our data analysis with some descriptive statistics. Table 1 reports the dependent variable distribution for both unweighted and weighted data. The data distribution reflects two features. First, there is a slight majority of the combination of "somewhat" and "much" responses (52.42 percent) compared to the combination of the "not at all" and "little" responses (47.58 percent), showing that people might be more inclined than not toward reinstatement of the death penalty. Second, most of the data rest with the extreme responses ("not at all," 35.83 percent and "much," 33.93 percent). Just as we have claimed earlier, Figure 2 shows just that: in our survey, people tend to offer much less support for the death penalty than for its reinstatement.[3]

[Table 1 about here]

[Figure 2 about here]

Tables 2-4 offer frequency accounts for both unweighted and weighted data of all four key independent variables, respondents' trust in politicians, trust in the judiciary system, support of the country's EU membership and belief that EU conditions help the country's democratization. One can easily notice respondents' low trust in both politicians and the judicial system as well as high support for the country's EU membership and high belief that EU membership conditions help the country's democratization.

[Table 2 about here]

[Table 3 about here]

[Table 4 about here]

[Table 5 about here]

Figure 3 visualizes our regression models and Table 6 tabulates results of our regression analysis: Models 1, 2 and 3 are predictive models of respondents' support for death penalty reinstatement. Model 1 includes only socioeconomic variables. We build Model 2 by adding our four key independent variables to Model 1, namely trust in politicians, trust in the judiciary, support for the country's EU membership, and belief that EU membership conditionality helps the country's democratization. Finally, we build Model 3 on Model 2 by adding four policy preferences, namely respondents prioritizing the country's EU membership, war on corruption, war on crime, and death penalty reinstatement.

Model 1 it shows that age serves as a strong predictor of higher support for death penalty reinstatement ($p < .000$). Self-identifying as a Muslim, Catholic, and Eastern Orthodox all positively predict higher support for reinstatement at 95 percent confidence level ($p < .002$, $p < .005$, and $p < .009$, respectively). Model 2 advances our narrative, by showing that trust in the judiciary negatively predicts support for reinstatement of the death penalty at the 99 percent confidence level ($p < .005$). This finding lends support to our Hypothesis 2. However, the lack of statistical significance for the relationship between believing that EU membership conditions

help the country's democratization, supporting the country's EU membership, and trusting the country's politicians on the one side and supporting capital punishment reinstatement on the other carry no statistical significance ($p < .085$, $p < .959$ and $p < .374$, respectively). In the case of Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, Model 2 does not help to reject the null hypothesis. Similar to Model 1, age positively predicts support for death penalty reinstatement at the 99.99 percent confidence level ($p < .000$), being a Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox positively predict support for death penalty reinstatement at the 99 percent confidence level ($p < .001$, $p < .005$, and $p < .006$, respectively). Being employed positively predicts support for death penalty reinstatement at the 95 percent confidence level ($p < .040$).

By adding four policy preferences to Model 2, Model 3 culminates our analytical efforts, and completes our narrative. Out of the four policy preferences introduced in the model, only prioritizing capital punishment restoration carries statistical significance ($p < .000$). Again, trust in the judiciary appears to be a negative predictor of support for death penalty reinstatement at the 95 percent confidence level ($p < .014$). In this model, the belief that EU membership conditionality helps the country's democratization also negatively predicts support for death penalty reinstatement at the 95 percent confidence level ($p < .045$). Also, Model 3 maintains much of the previous strong performance of some of the socioeconomic variables (for age, $p < .000$; for Muslim, $p < .001$; for Catholic, $p < .003$; for Orthodox, $p < .005$, and for those not affiliated with religion, $p < .044$).

[Figure 3 about here]

[Table 6 about here]

Discussion

The data narrative supports two of our four hypotheses. Consistent with our hypotheses, Models 2 and 3 showed that there is a stronger negative correlation between trust in the judiciary and support for reinstatement of the death penalty, as well as a negative relationship between believing that EU membership conditions help the country's democratization and support for capital punishment reinstatement. But most importantly, the addition of the four policy preferences is the key to interpreting our findings. Except for prioritizing death penalty restoration, none of the other policy preferences' relationships with the dependent variable acquire any statistical significance. Therefore, we have no evidence that respondents relate prioritizing war on crime with their support for reinstatement of the death penalty. Those results support our argument that peoples' support for reinstatement of the death penalty in countries with inefficient judiciaries might reflect more a protest against such incompetent institutions than their true lust for the death penalty as a means to control crime.

Such a conclusion becomes clearer when we consider the findings related to respondents' support for the country's EU membership and how much they believe EU membership conditions help the country's democratization. First, there exists no statistically significant relationship between respondents' support for the country's EU membership and their support for capital punishment restoration. Second, there is a clear negative relationship between respondents' view of EU membership conditionality as an instrument that helps Albania's democratization and their support for reinstatement of the death penalty. Third, there is no evidence that respondents relate prioritizing the country's EU membership with their support for death penalty reinstatement. Therefore, whereas there seems to be neither particular animosity against nor any unusual affection for the country's EU membership, we can interpret as protest the strong negative correlation between respondents' view of EU membership conditionality as an instrument that helps Albania's democratization and their support for death penalty

restoration. The seed of such a protest might rest on the fact that EU included in 1998 the abolition of the death penalty among the conditions that all EU aspiring member countries, most of them from the former communist Central and Eastern Europe, should adopt in order to become members of the Union (Peshkopia & Imami, 2008). It becomes clear that this particular policy, and not any rejection of the EU membership *per se*, that respondents seem to protest when they negatively relate their opinions about EU membership conditionality as a tool for the country's democratization and their support for reinstatement of the death penalty. Coupled with similarly protest-driven correlations between respondents' support for capital punishment restoration and their trust in politicians and the judiciary, it appears that our argument has found sufficient support in favor of viewing support for reinstatement of capital punishment in countries that have abolished it more as a protest attitude against inefficient and corrupt judiciaries in those countries than a lust for such an extreme form of punishment. Whether or not a presumably restored death penalty would be able to effectively fight crime, this seems to be neither the primary concern of the respondents nor the scope of this paper. Most likely, the protest is addressed against the judiciary's inefficiency in way broader terms than simply fighting crime. It seems to be that kind of moral outrage against perceived violation of important values or principles which, as Van Stekelenburg et al. (2009) argue, more likely lead to protests in which people express their views and indignation.

Conclusions

We tested the hypotheses that Albanians' trust in the country's politicians and judiciary system positively predict their support for reinstatement of the death penalty. Also, we tested the hypotheses that Albanians' support for EU membership and their beliefs that EU membership conditions help the country's democratization negatively predict their support for reinstatement of the death penalty. We found evidence only that trust in country's judicial system negatively predicts support for the reinstatement of the death penalty, and that beliefs that EU membership conditions help the country's democratization positively predicts support for reinstatement of the death penalty. We argued that, support for the death penalty in countries with inefficient and corrupt judicial systems might reflect protest against an untrustworthy judiciary and the political class that controls it rather than an instrumentalist behavior built on fear of crime and belief in capital punishment's effectiveness as a means to fight crime. However, we were not able to find any evidence of the relationship between support for capital punishment reinstatement on the one side and trust in country's politicians and support for country's EU membership on the other.

Additional analysis helped to support our argument: the fact that we found no evidence of respondents relating their support for death penalty restoration with prioritizing war on crime and/or prioritizing country's EU membership shows that instrumental reasons for supporting capital punishment reinstatement might not be at play. The empirical evidence coming out of the statistical analysis and the discussion of the findings support our argument: support for reinstatement of the death penalty in countries that have abolished it might represent a protest attitude.

Our findings could contribute to a minority research opus focusing on support for capital punishment reinstatement rather than attitudes toward the death penalty. Both abolitionists and retentionists have been focused on the US death penalty battleground, concerned primarily with the peculiarity of the US death penalty as well as its theoretical and practical implications and ramifications rather than the relationship between peoples' view of the death penalty as an indicator of their relationship with their judicial systems. Scholars have followed suit. The existing literature has mostly ignored peoples' attitudes toward reinstatement of the death

penalty, especially in democratic or democratizing abolitionist countries, based on the assumption that, once it is abolished, democratic societies accept the abolition of the death penalty, thus making the death penalty abolition irreversible (Peshkopia & Imami, 2008). The general trend of ignoring the nuanced factors behind peoples' attitudes toward the death penalty and its reinstatement seems unfazed by refuting evidence. This ignores the possibility that death penalty reinstatement in abolitionist countries might reflect the downplaying of the role of strong emotions and worldviews associated with capital punishment. Embracing such an approach requires going beyond the instrumental application of the death penalty in crime control and protecting human lives. Trying to cross such boundaries, framing support for death penalty reinstatement as a protest attitude against an inefficient judiciary, as well as against EU membership conditionality as an instrument that brought about its abolition in Albania would provide both a contribution to such an emerging theoretical framework, and a working policy proposition: support for capital punishment reinstatement could be actively curved by improving the performance of the judiciary system and its credibility among the public.

We tested our argument in Albania, but obviously we would need more empirical evidence both in time and space to support this argument as a generalized legitimate and contending approach. Unfortunately, as discussed above, there is a lack of sufficient data for cross-country analyses in this aspect since most abolitionists consider the death penalty debate in Central and Eastern Europe to be over. This is far from truth, and a carefully consideration of determinants and associates of the lingering high support for the death penalty and its reinstatement in the central and eastern parts of the European continent would benefit those societies. Hopefully, the abolitionist societies, along with their decision-makers and scholars, grasp such a reality and dedicate it the appropriate time and energies.

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

Figure 1. Distribution of policy preference ranking



Figure 2. Value distributions for support for death penalty and support for death penalty reinstatement



Figure 3. Ordered probit models predicting attitudes toward death penalty reinstatement

Table 1. Support for death penalty reinstatement with unweighted and weighted data

How much do you support the death penalty reinstatement?	Unweighted data			Weighted data		
	Respondents	Percentage	Cumulative	Respondents	Percentage	Cumulative
Not at all	814	35.83	35.83	822.51	36.20	36.20
Little	267	11.75	47.58	255.72	11.26	47.46
Somewhat	420	18.49	66.07	416.57	18.33	65.79
Much	771	33.93	100.00	777.20	34.21	100.00
Total	2,272	100.00		2,272	100.00	

Table 2. Trust in country's judiciary with unweighted and weighted data

How much do you trust Albania's judicial system?	Unweighted data			Weighted data		
	Respondents	Percentage	Cumulative	Respondents	Percentage	Cumulative
Not at all	1,104	47.61	47.61	1,131.73	48.80	48.80
Little	599	25.83	73.44	585.43	25.25	74.05
Somewhat	468	20.18	93.62	449.78	19.40	93.44
Much	148	6.38	100.00	152.05	6.56	100.00
Total	2,319	100.00		2,319	100.00	

Table 3. Trust in country's politicians with unweighted and weighted data

How much do you trust Albania's politicians?	Unweighted data			Weighted data		
	Respondents	Percentage	Cumulative	Respondents	Percentage	Cumulative
Not at all	1,121	48.32	48.32	1,147.12	49.44	49.44
Little	514	22.16	70.47	494.63	21.32	70.77
Somewhat	513	22.11	92.59	503.56	21.71	92.47
Much	172	7.41	100.00	174.69	7.53	100.00
Total	2,320	100.00		2,320	100.00	

Table 4. Support for country's EU membership

How much do you support Albania's EU membership?	Unweighted data			Weighted data		
	Respondents	Percentage	Cumulative	Respondents	Percentage	Cumulative
Not at all	112	4.78	4.78	102.81	4.39	4.39
Little	140	5.97	10.75	146.40	6.25	10.63
Somewhat	436	18.60	29.35	444.35	18.96	29.59
Much	1,656	70.65	100.00	1,650.44	70.41	100.00
Total	2,344	100.00		2,320	100.00	

Table 5. Beliefs that EU membership conditions help country's democratization

How much do you think that EU conditions help Albania's democratization?	Unweighted data			Weighted data		
	Respondents	Percentage	Cumulative	Respondents	Percentage	Cumulative
Not at all	109	4.73	4.73	101.15	4.39	4.39
Little	241	10.46	15.18	249.35	10.82	15.21
Somewhat	724	31.41	46.59	729.63	31.65	46.86
Much	1,231	53.41	100.00	1,224.87	53.14	100.00
Total	2,305	100.00		2,305	100.00	

TABLE 6. Predictive Models of People's Support for Reinstatement of Death Penalty on weighted, multiple imputed data

ORDERED PROBIT Dependent variable: Support for the death penalty reinstatement	MODEL 1 Predictive Model	MODEL 2 Predictive Model	MODEL 3 Predictive Model
Age	.15 ***	.15 ***	.13 ***
	.02	*.02*	*.02*
Gender	-.09	-.08	-.06
	.06	*.06*	*.06*
Years of education	-.31	-.32	-.28
	.26	*.26*	*.27*
Muslim	.38 **	.39 **	.40 **
	.12	*.12*	*.12*
Catholic	.44 **	.43 **	.46 **
	.16	*.15*	*.15*
Orthodox	.37 **	.39 **	.40 **
	.14	*.14*	*.14*
No religion	.27	.27	.30 *
	.15	*.15*	*.15*
Frequency of practicing religion	.05	.08	.06
	.10	*.10*	*.10*
Household economy better off	-.01	-.01	-.00
	.08	*.08*	*.08*
Personal income	-.18	-.17	-.19
	.11	*.11*	*.11*
Employed	.12 *	.11 *	.11
	.06	*.06*	*.06*
Trusts country's politician		-.08	-.07
		.10	*.10*
Trusts country's judiciary		-.27 **	-.23 *
		.10	*.10*
Supports country's EU membership		-.03	.02
		.11	*.12*
EU conditions help democratization		-.20	-.23 *
		.11	*.11*
Prioritizes country's EU membership			-.14
			.13
Prioritizes fight corruption			.05
			.13
Prioritizes fight crime			.12

Prioritizes reinstatement of death penalty			*.13* .67 *** *.12*
Imputation	10	10	10
Number of observations	2366	2366	2366
Prob. *F*	.000	.000	.000

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in italics below the β coefficients. ***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$.